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Abstract: 
In this analysis of institutional investor performance, two questions are addressed. 
First, what degree of similarity is observed within the market place for retail 
superannuation funds?  Second, what are the implications of homogenous behaviour 
for member choice policy?  The answers from this study are as follows: as an 
industry, institutional investors destroyed value for superannuation investors for the 
period 1991 through 2003, under-performing passive portfolio returns by around 60 
basis points per annum.  Moreover, we find there is a great deal of clustering around 
this average underperformance.  It also appears as though funds have similar risk 
characteristics which are, on average, defensive.  The findings suggest that the 
products offered by those competing in this market are very similar in nature, hence 


















Do superannuation fund returns ‘flock together’?
1  And, if so, what are the implications for 
the proposed policy of member choice in superannuation currently being debated?
2  The 
answers to these important questions are less than clear.  Whilst a broad consensus has 
been reached in the literature that institutional investors are homogenous (from Friend, 
Blume and Crockett, 1970, through to Dennis and Strickland, 2002), the reasons why are 
more contested. 
 
Prior to directly examining the implications of institutional investor homogeneity on choice 
of superannuation fund, a useful starting point comes from considering a definition of 
homogeneity or herding.  While there are numerous definitions of in the literature, we rely 
on Davis and Steil’s (2001) characterisation of herding as the “mimetic behaviour on the 
part of managers [pp. 444]”.  The Davis and Steil (2001) conception of herding is useful 
to this discussion as it allows us to initially consider the motives for mimicking by 
institutional investors, and then move to discussion on the impacts of such behaviour on 
proposals of member choice in superannuation. 
 
Wermers (1999) neatly summarises that there are four popular theories for explaining 
why institutional investors might trade together.  The first three of these explanations are 
premised on the role of private information, with the final explanation considering the role 
of institutional constraints that lead to herding behaviour.  The contribution of Scharfstein 
and Stein (1990) represents the first group of papers that suggest clustering behaviour is 
                                                      
1 We acknowledge Wermers (1999) for introducing the ‘flock together’ analogy to the literature on the homogeneity of institutional 
investor returns. 
 
2 See Bateman (2002), Brown, Gallery and Gallery (2002), and Drew and Stanford (2002) for discussion on the controversies 
surrounding member choice legislation. 
 the result of reputational risk, that is, private information is disregarded over concerns of 
acting differently from the cohort in which the fund is a member.  Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1992) and Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman (1994) lead the second area of 
explanation, suggesting that it is the fundamental analysis approach to asset selection 
decisions used by the majority of institutional investors results that in the industry 
receiving correlated private information, thus leading to herding behaviour. 
 
The third area of research that considers reasons for herding are related to the “looking-
over-the-shoulder” hypothesis of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992).  The 
hypothesis put forward by this group of researchers suggests that funds may infer private 
information from the trades of winning institutional investors and trade in a similar 
direction – hence the “looking over the shoulder” hypothesis.  The final cluster of papers 
considering the source of herding behaviour is led by Falkenstein (1996), and places less 
onus on the role of private information, looking to institutional factors that explain 
herding.  The central theme of this research is that the various rules and regulations 
imposed on institutional investors, such as risk management rules relating to the liquidity 
of stocks that can be held in the portfolio, are the cause of herding. 
 
Such behaviour by institutional investors has particular relevance to Australia’s system of 
retirement income provision (termed superannuation) and the current debate surrounding 
member choice, as evidence of homogeneity (herding) of fund behaviour would erode the 
potential welfare benefits of any such policy.  The Commonwealth Government announced 
a policy of choice of fund in 1996 and introduced a detailed proposal in the 1997 Budget.  
Specific proposals for choice of fund were introduced into Parliament in December 1997.  
Originally introduced as Schedule 5 to the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 1997, the choice 
legislation was re-introduced on November 12, 1998 in revised form as the 
 
 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Bill 1998.  This 
Bill passed in the House of Representatives in February 16, 1999, but debate on the Bill in 
the Senate was adjourned on February 1999; the Bill was defeated in the Senate in 
August 2001.  At the time of writing, the Minister responsible, Senator the Hon. Helen 
Coonan, announced Government will reintroduce the Choice Bill for debate in Parliament’s 
final sittings for the year.
3
 
While it is difficult to foresee the final form that choice policy will take in Australia, this 
study considers the merits of a policy in which complete portability of superannuation 
assets for individuals will result.  This allows us to invoke a presumption of consumer 
sovereignty, and permits an evaluation of possible welfare outcomes in light of the 
behaviour of institutional investors.  To investigate the possible benefits of choice to 
investors, this study considers the heterogeneity (or otherwise) of the cohort of competing 
superannuation funds in the market place.  While there are thousands of complying 
superannuation funds for investors to choose from, this study considers the largest asset 
exposure by superannuation funds (i.e. Australian equities) held in the most accessible 
investment vehicle (i.e. retail superannuation funds). 
 
In Australia, retail superannuation funds currently manage around one-third of retirement 
savings, or AUD 155 billion (APRA 2001), the largest distribution to any single fund-type.
4  
The Productivity Commission (2001) defines retail funds as public offer superannuation 
funds that members join by purchasing investment units or policies that are sold through 
intermediaries such as financial planners.   The definition is appropriate for this study, 
                                                      
3 For details see the transcript of the address “Building the National Nest Egg Challenges for a Greying Australia” by Senator the Hon. 
Helen Coonan, Minister for Revenue and Assistant Treasurer to the Investment and Financial Services Association, Sydney, 20
th 
November 2003 (accessed on Saturday, 29
th November 2003 at http://assistant.treasurer.gov.au/atr/content/speeches/2003/018.asp). 
 
4 As at September 2001, APRA (2001) reports that the top five distribution of funds were as follows: Retail Sector (AUD 155bn); Public 
Sector (AUD 103bn); Small Funds (AUD 85bn); Corporate (AUD 69bn); and, Industry (44bn). 
 
 
 with one amendment.  The retail fund market includes two sub-sets, funds for individual 
investors (retail funds), and, funds designed for the professional investors (wholesale 
funds).  The distinction between the two markets can be found by the minimum 
investment requirement on a per fund basis and cost structure.  A typical ‘retail’ fund has 
a minimum entry amount of AUD 2,000 and levies an average annual management 
expense ratio of around 1.95%.  In addition, these funds may charge up to 5% of the 
contribution as an entry load, with a 3% exit load.  This is in contrast to a wholesale fund 
with an initial investment amount of, say, AUD 250,000 with an annual management 
expense ratio of 0.75%.  In addition, wholesale funds have no entry or exit loads.  As the 
average superannuation balance per member in Australia is AUD 59,400 (APRA 2001), we 
focus our analysis in this study to the individual investor sub-set of the market.   In a 
complete superannuation choice framework, retail funds for individual investors would be 
the market most accessible to Australians. 
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) (2001) report that, as an asset 
class, domestic equities account for approximately 37 per cent of the assets held by all 
superannuation funds.  As stocks are subject to income and capital fluctuations (the 
degree of risk of this type of asset class is higher than that associated with most other 
forms of investment) they have a relatively high expected return.  Therefore, long-term 
investors (such as superannuation investors) hold stocks with the expectation of achieving 
real growth of retirement savings, with the objective of accumulating sufficient capital to 
privately fund consumption throughout retirement. 
 
Given that choice is on the policy agenda, this paper addresses the question of whether 
superannuation fund members actually have a choice across the investment products in 
the market place.  Specifically, we ask: does the herding behaviour of institutional 
investors limit the potential benefits of choice policy?  This question is addressed in two 
 
 interlinked ways.  Initially, from the return perspective, a number of received performance 
metrics are employed to evaluate the heterogeneity of the excess returns of institutional 
investors.  Finally, from the risk perspective, a simple cross sectional analysis of the 
systematic risk profile of retail funds is undertaken to highlight the differences of the 
composition of fund portfolios.
5
 
In doing so, a number of interesting patterns are revealed.  First, we provide confirmatory 
evidence to the international experience that, as an industry, retail superannuation funds 
(specialising in the management of Australian equities) do not earn excess returns.  In 
short, the industry earns less return per unit of risk than the market portfolio.  Second, 
there is relatively little cross sectional variation in excess returns, with fund performance 
appearing to exhibit a pattern of herding.  Third, not only are the systematic risk profiles 
similar within the cohort, the industry is found to be (on average) defensive in its portfolio 
construction approach with funds consistently holding portfolios less risky than the market 
(that is, systematic risk less than unity).  Therefore, on average, the industry performs 
relatively poorly (well) in bull (bear) markets.  Finally, it is our conjecture that regardless 
of the extent of portability and choice granted to investors by policy makers, there is, in 
reality, very little choice in this important segment of the market due to fund 
homogeneity. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Section II describes the data used in 
this study for the period 1991 through 2003.  Section III discusses the methodological 
approach, with an emphasis on the performance metrics applied to institutional investor 
returns.  Section IV provides analysis of the performance of retail superannuation funds 
specialising in the management of Australian equities.  The similarities of the funds from 
which members can select from are considered from both excess return and systematic 
                                                      
5 The risk and performance metrics used in this paper build on the work of Bird, Chin, and McCrae, (1982), for a critique of such 
metrics, see Okunev (1990). 
 
 risk perspectives.  The central arguments proposed in the paper are considered in Section 
V, including policy alternatives and implications for member choice. 
 
II. Data Collection 
van Eyk Research (van Eyk), an independent measurement service in Australia, provided 
return data on retail ‘Superannuation Funds Australian Equity – General’ for the period 
January 1991 through July 2003, a total of 151 monthly observations.
6  The data 
considered is net of management expenses but excludes entry and exit loads.
7  To 
minimise the problem of survivorship bias, all funds in existence over the observation 
period were initially considered, including all terminated funds.  The only funds excluded 
from the population were those with less than 30 monthly observations, resulting in a 
sample size of 161 funds.  Figure 1 reports the number of funds in the monthly cross 
sectional samples. 
Figure 1: Number of Funds 
 
                                                      
6 One of the motivating factors to commence the analysis from 1991 is that this is the year in which the government announced the 
introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee (SG) (implemented in 1992). 
7 The study considers return data net of management fees for all funds (surviving and terminated).  To avoid problems of survivorship 
bias, we do not consider entry loads as these are available for surviving funds only.  For a discussion on the issue of funds management 




 The funds are separated into three categories by van Eyk: open-end; closed-end; and, 
non-surviving or terminated funds.  Open-end funds, commonly referred to as unit trusts, 
may issue or redeem additional units of the fund at net asset value.  The retail funds 
considered in this study require a minimum initial investment of AUD 2,000 with minimum 
contributions of AUD 100.  Closed-end funds sell units to investors only once, at the time 
of offer.  These funds do not issue additional units and may not redeem units on demand.  
A lack of liquidity may prevent an investor from exiting this fund.  However, the effect of 
large capital inflows and outflows from contributors is minimal, giving managers some 
control over the assets under management.  Finally, the non-surviving cohort includes 
funds that ceased operations over the observation period.  These funds are included in the 
analysis as exclusion of this segment would result in an overestimation of historical 
returns. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) advocate the use of a benchmark proxy that reflects each 
fund’s investment strategy to augment the precision of performance evaluations.  One of 
the advantages of the sample investigated in this study is that the asset allocation 
parameters are known.  To have membership in the category, funds are required to hold 
at least 80 percent of assets in a general portfolio of Australian equities, with a maximum 
of 20 percent in domestic fixed interest securities.  After an investigation of the fund 




In a similar manner to many previous studies of institutional investor performance 
(Malkiel 1995, Blake, Lehmann and Timmermann 1998) we employ a number of received 
                                                      
8 See Drew and Stanford (2003).  For the period 1991 through 1999, Drew and Stanford (2003) find a large-capitalisation focus in the 
mandates of this cohort of funds. 
 
 
 risk-adjustment procedures.  In achieving the research objective, the analysis commences 
with the excess return from a single index model. 
 
i ft mt i i ft it R R R R ε β α + − + = − ) (  (1) 
 
where: 
αi  =  risk adjusted abnormal return from the single index model; 
Rft  =  return on the Reserve Bank of Australia 13 week T-note in month t; 
Rmt  =  return on the S&P/ASX 200 accumulation index in month t; 
βi     =  factor sensitivity of difference in fund return and the risk free rate; and, 
εi   =  random error term. 
 
Jensen’s (1968) single index model (CAPM), posits that the security’s return should be 
linearly related to its risk, as measured by beta.  The intercept term detects whether 
managers have superior forecasting abilities, with alpha generated by selecting securities 
resulting in εi > 0.
9  As Equation (1) is a single-period model, estimating the regression 
over time should allow investors to have heterogeneous investment horizons.   
Furthermore, returns are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (IID) 
through time and jointly multi-variate normal. 
 
While general criticisms can be made of the CAPM, one specific criticism is that Equation 
(1) assumes that a fund’s systematic risk is constant over time.  The inability of such tests 
                                                      
9 Alpha generation will be significantly positive if the fund manager has the ability to forecast future security prices.  Alpha will be zero 
if the manager mimics the composition of a reference benchmark.  Finally, alpha will be significantly negative if the find manager 
performs worse than a naive strategy of random selection. 
 
 
 to incorporate dynamic risk strategies by managers may result in a regression estimate of 
αi that may be significantly biased downward (Grant 1977, and Lee and Rahman 1990). 
 
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) (TM) addressed this concern with the development of a 
quadratic market model.  Through the addition of a quadratic term to Equation (1), 
portfolio returns are a non-linear function of the market return.  This provides a measure 
of the timing abilities of fund managers. 
 
i mt i mt i i it R R R ε γ β α + + + =
2  (2) 
 
where: 
γi  =  risk adjusted measure of market timing ability of fund i. 
 
Market timing ability will be reflected by greater market exposure when the excess market 
returns are higher and vice versa.  A significantly positive value of gamma would indicate 
superior market timing ability.  If gamma does not deviate significantly from zero, the 
manager cannot outguess the market.  If gamma is significantly negative, there has been 
perverse market timing undertaken by the manager. 
 
Chapman and Pearson (2000) demonstrated that the problem of multicollinearity resulting 
from a model taking a non-linear functional f o r m  i s  r e s o l v e d  b y  t h e  t e c h n i q u e  o f  
orthogonalised polynomials.
10  T h i s  i s  a c h i e v e d  b y  t r a n s f o r m i n g  t h e  s q u a r e d  e x c e s s  
market return variable and the excess market return variable with a dummy variable, 
resulting in a transformed TM model: 
                                                      
10 See Draper and Smith (1998) for a detailed discussion of orthogonalised polynomials. 
 
 i mt i i mt i i it R p R R ε γ β α + + + = ) (  (3) 
The new regressor, pi (Rmt), is formed as the regression residual of Rmt
2 and DRmt (under 
separate equations) onto a constant.  This is then scaled to have a standard deviation 
equal to the standard deviation of the dependent variable, Rit.  These orthogonalised and 
scaled monomials have the incremental effect of adding the original terms in Equation (2).  
The alpha parameter estimates from Equation (3) will be reported throughout the study. 
 
One criticism of the first two evaluative techniques described previously is the time 
invariant nature of parameter estimates.  We follow Ferson and Schadt (1996) (FS) in 
allowing for variation in systematic risk and hence benchmark returns. 
 
i ft mt t i i ft it R R R R ε β α + − + = − ) ( ,  (4) 
where: 
βi,t    =  where,   and   is a vector of instruments for the information 
variables available at time t-1.  This includes the dividend yield on the 
S&P/ASX 200 index and one- and ten-year Commonwealth Government bond 
rates. 
1 1 0 , ' − + = t t i Z b b β 1 − t Z
Given that institutional investors are often evaluated relative to peer performance, returns 
will also be compared to a rudimentary, risk-unadjusted, measure of fund return relative 
t o  a n  i n d e x  o f  p e er  r e t u r n  ( P E E R ) .   P r e liminary estimates of average performance are 
obtained from: 
Rit - Rpt  (5) 
 
where: 




We commence our analysis from the perspective of excess returns using the 
aforementioned approaches.  Table 1 provides summary statistics from the cross sectional 
distribution of the annualised alphas from each of these approaches.  These measures of 
excess return will be considered initially at an aggregated level, followed by subsequent 
discussion of the full cross sectional behaviour of institutional investor returns, at a 
disaggregated level.
11
Table 1: Summary Measures of Cross Sectional Distribution of Alphas 





























75 0.815  0.813  0.446  1.259 
90 2.489  2.491  2.036  2.851 
95 3.666  3.673  3.281  3.878 








IQ Range  2.589  2.572  2.536  2.815 
 
At an aggregated level, irrespective of the risk adjustment procedure employed (CAPM, 
TM or FS), it appears as though the average retail superannuation fund, (specialising in 
the management of Australian equities) under-performed market indices (given that t-
stats are significantly less than zero) for the period 1991 through 2003.  In contrast to 
                                                      
11 The results reported here focus on the cross-sectional distribution of alphas (in this section) and betas (in the upcoming section).  The 
average coefficient of determination (R
2) for the models are: CAPM (0.65), TM (0.67), FS(0.71), with the average Durbin-Watson 
statistics of CAPM (2.01), TM (1.96), FS(1.99). 
 
 
 market or risk-based approaches to evaluation, relative to peer performance (PEER) there 
is no significant out- or under-performance. 
 
The level of underperformance relative to the index benchmark ranges from 56 to 66 
basis points per annum over the period 1991 through 2003.  These findings are consistent 
with those from the United States by Malkiel (1995) and Gruber (1996), the United 
Kingdom by Bal and Leger (1996) and Leger (1997) and Australia by Sawicki (2000), 
Sawicki and Ong (2000) and Drew and Stanford (2003).  In summary, these studies 
report that the average equity mutual fund under-performs index returns by a range of 50 
to 100 basis points per annum.
12
 
Such a level of underperformance has a direct impact on the final accumulated balance of 
superannuation savings in a defined contribution plan.  For an individual who is 30 years 
of age, holds a starting balance of $50,000, contributes $5,000 per annum and will retire 
at age 65, underperformance of around 60 basis points per annum results in a 15 per cent 
reduction in the final accumulated balance.  From the perspective of choice, the results 
show that the most likely outcome is for the member to select a fund that generates 
negative excess returns (see  0 = α  percentile in Table 1).  While this result in itself is 
received in the literature (see, for instance, Sharpe 1966 and the previous work cited), a 
more important question for the member is the degree with which funds cluster around 
this average negative outcome.  It is this second question that provides us with a guide as 
to the potency, or otherwise, of any proposal relating to member choice. 
Therefore, unlike the overwhelming majority of previous studies characterised by the 
aggregation of individual fund performance (Malkiel 1995, Gruber 1996, Drew and 
                                                      
12 Recent evidence from Wermers (2000) finds that while gross returns from US equity mutual fund holdings outperform a broad market 
index by 130 basis points per year, the net fund returns under-perform the same index by 100 basis points per year. 
 
 
 Stanford 2003), this study follows a disaggregated approach similar to that of Blake et. 
al., (1996) who considered the cross sectional variation of pension fund performance in 
the United Kingdom.  In short, it is argued that measures of dispersion and shape of the 
distribution (at the disaggregated level) are useful for directly addressing the question of 
homogeneity. 
 
Clearly, irrespective of the benchmarking procedure employed, the shape of the cross 
sectional distribution is invariant (only its position changes when considering the risk-
unadjusted peer benchmark).  Given that each cross sectional distribution is highly 
leptokurtic (CAPM 70.225, TM 72.191, FS 73.296, PEER 58.203), it is argued that this 
reflects a high degree of homogeneity in fund returns.  An alternate method is to examine 
the inter-quartile range of excess returns to provide an economic measure of 
homogeneity.  It is apparent that the excess returns generated by funds are quite similar 
in that 50 per cent of the funds lie within a relatively narrow range of 250 basis points.  
Once again, these results have implications f o r  m e m b e r s  i n  t h a t  n o  o n l y  d o  f u n d s  o n  
average underperform, but there is great deal of clustering around this average 
underperformance.  These results bring into question the potential welfare gains of choice 
policy given the high degree of fund homogeneity. 
 
The first section of the analysis considered excess returns, that is, institutional investor 
performance was standardised for a given level of systematic risk (excluding PEER).  It 
has been shown that members have little choice in selecting between managers that can 
outperform risk adjusted benchmarks.  Attention will now be turned to the issue of the 
degree to which members can differentiate between funds on the basis of risk.  Given the 
similarity of results from the four approaches used in the study, this discussion will focus 
 
 on systematic risk estimates from the CAPM (Equation 1).  The analysis commences with 
an examination of an estimate of the distribution of betas, which is provided in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Cross Sectional Distribution of Beata Estimates 
 
 
Upon examination of Figure 2, two general patterns emerge. It is immediately apparent 
that, on average, the risk profiles of funds are less than unity and lie within a relatively 
narrow range.  Table 2 reports more detailed analysis of the degree of similarity in risk 
profiles. 













Table 2 suggests that at least 95% of funds in this sample have made defensive asset 
selection decisions, meaning that the overwhelming majority of funds have betas of less 
than unity.  It is also clear, that given the inter-quartile range of 0.122, there is little 
differentiation in terms of risk profiles across the sample of funds.  Evidence of 
homogeneity is supported by the kurtosis measure reported in Table 2 (and is a pattern 
revealed in Figure 2).  We can also extend this analysis to look at time varying betas (FS) 
to consider the question of whether institutional investors change their asset selection 
policy through various market conditions (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Conditional Betas and Market Conditions 
 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates that a great deal of homogeneity is evident regardless of market 
conditions.  Beta estimates consistently cluster around the 0.80 to 0.85 level confirming 
an unconditional bias toward defensive asset selection strategies.  While it is not within 
the scope of this paper to comment on the various strategic and business risk 
 
 considerations in institutional investors herding around this narrow systematic risk band, 




Australia, like most other OECD nations, has a home-bias in the equities asset class, with 
the domestic equities accounting for 44% of total superannuation assets compared to its 
international proportion of global market capitalisation at around 1.5% (APRA 2001).   
Given the long-term investment horizon of retirement savings, the performance of 
domestic equities is the central driver for wealth creation.  It seems curious, from an 
investment perspective, that over the thirteen years to 2003, the industry has, on 
average, made defensive asset selection decisions in a growth asset class.  Therefore, it is 
important to highlight that when members choose from the menu of options available in 
this market segment, they will only be partially exposed (at around 80 per cent) to the 
risk-reward characteristics of the Australian equities asset class.  From the broader asset 
allocation perspective, the industry’s decision to hold defensive portfolios somewhat alters 
the nature of the asset class.  That is, if asset allocation decisions were based on index 
returns (beta of 1.00) a discrepancy between optimal weights across various asset classes 
would result. 
 
A secondary issue that arises from the defensive nature of the industry relates to the 
performance of this cohort of funds in various market conditions.  The results suggest that 
superannuation funds specialising in the management of Australian equities will, as an 
industry, perform relatively poorly (well) in bull (bear) markets.  To confirm this idea, we 
examine the fund returns across varying market conditions.  Figure 4 reports estimates of 
the cross sectional distribution of raw fund returns relative to market conditions.  It shows 
                                                      
13 Arteaga, Ciccotello and Grant (1998) examine strategic and business risk considerations in institutional investor behaviour when 
marketing new funds. 
 
 that, on average, when market returns are good (poor) the majority of funds under (out) 
perform the broader market.  Furthermore, there is a greater level of dispersion within the 
sample of fund returns as the broader market becomes more volatile.  While this 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  c o n f o r m s  t o  s t a n d a r d  f i n a n c e  t h e o r y ,  i t  w o u l d  a p p e a r  a s  t h o u g h  m e m b e r s  
have little ability to differentiate between funds from the risk perspective. 




Choice and portability of superannuation balances in Australia is currently being debated.  
It is our belief that the welfare benefits of choice are positively related to the 
heterogeneity of the investment funds from which members can select from.   
International evidence has suggested that institutional investors behave in a mimetic 
manner (see Wermers 1999).  While the motives for such behaviour are contested, the 
mere presence of herding limits the potency of choice policy, in that members have little 
ability to differentiate between funds. 
 
 
 In considering the homogeneity of superannuation funds (in terms of both return and risk) 
a number of salient features have been revealed.  From the excess return perspective, it 
appears difficult for members to differentiate between funds.  It is estimated that around 
two-thirds of superannuation funds under-performed the market portfolio on a risk-
adjusted basis.  While this result is well accepted, the cross-sectional nature of these 
excess returns demonstrated that there was a strong degree of clustering around the 
average level of underperformance.  From the perspective of systematic risk, 
differentiating between funds is again difficult.  On average, funds are defensive in nature, 
and ‘flock around’ this risk profile. 
 
It is our conjecture that the benefits of any model of choice policy will be inhibited by the 
mimetic behaviour of institutional investors.  While this research makes no comment on 
the competitiveness of the industry, it appears that the products offered by those 
competing in this market are very similar in nature.
14  Therefore, while the underlying 
tenants of choice policy are sound (particularly those relating to the welfare gains flowing 
from consumer sovereignty) we argue that the focus of the current debate is misplaced.  
In summary, the current fascination with the specificity of the policy framework should 
shift to ensuring that members can choose from clearly differentiated products when 
investing superannuation assets.  While future research can address the issue of welfare 
gains in a post-choice environment, if the current market structure were to continue, 
little, if any, gains in welfare will accrue to the fund member. 
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